INTRODUCTION
The United States has invested heavily in its ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force, which now carries the bulk of the deployed U.S. nuclear arsenal and stands at the center of its current and future nuclear deterrent. The U.S. Navy also relies on its stealthy nuclear attack submarine (SSN) fleet to provide intelligence and to serve as a potent forward-deployed asset in enemy waters to engage threats far from U.S. shores. In the face of these strategies, growing global proliferation of advanced submarines, which are stealthier and carry better armaments than during the Cold War, is creating potential new risks to the security of U.S. SSBN and SSN operations. At the same time, emerging technologies in the field of unmanned surface and subsurface vessels raise the prospect of further complicating U.S. undersea operations, particularly in littoral waters. Ironically, many experts still discount the viability of hostile operations against U.S. SSNs and recent analysis of future U.S. SSBN requirements focuses almost exclusively on submarine costs and missile numbers, failing even to consider ASW as an issue.
1 Within the nuclear Navy, the topic of possible SSBN vulnerabilities is discussed privately by submariners (including in personal discussions with the author for this project), but is virtually a taboo subject in the Navy's printed media or speeches. This scoping study reviews the changing undersea threat environment and examines possible implications for U.S. Navy nuclear operations and for strategic stability more generally.
In order to accomplish this analysis, the report first reviews the factors that promoted strategic stability at sea during the Cold War. It then examines emerging undersea threats (in blue-, green-, and brown-water areas) and assesses how they might . Surprisingly, while the report mentions the possibility of consolidating SSBNs to a single home port, and fewer than 12 submarines, there is no consideration of ASW threats to such a consolidated force as an issue to put before the U.S. Congress in its deliberations. Similarly, see John K. Warden, "After a New START," Proceedings (June 2012), which discusses the role of the need for a sea-based deterrent despite budget difficulties, but not possible concerns raised by future ASW threats.
midget submarines and semi-submersibles operated by smugglers or terrorists, to autonomous tracking vessels may expand Navy missions (and potential risks) in the future undersea domain. Finally, it concludes with an analysis of U.S. submarine procurement plans for the next 20 years, offering a critique of currently planned investments and some specific suggestions of alternative purchases that wouldaccording to the findings of this research-more closely fit the future needs of the Navy and our nuclear deterrent forces while better addressing the challenges posed by emerging undersea technologies and their proliferation.
STRATEGIC STABILITY DURING THE COLD WAR
The Cold War argument on the stabilizing role of Cold War strategic submarines was based on three main assumptions: 1) that these vessels possessed a secure stand-off capability due to the long range of their weaponry; 2) that the submarines, due to their nuclear power and the limits of then-available anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology, had the ability to hide anywhere in the world's oceans, thus rendering them virtually invulnerable to detection and attack; and 3) that no exports of this technology would ever be allowed because of the risks posed by the presence of multiple actors able both to deliver nuclear weapons at sea and possess full nuclear-fuel-cycle capabilities.
But it is now worthwhile, years after the Cold War and with the benefit of declassified information, to reexamine these assumptions. If these factors are prerequisites for strategic stability at sea, it is important to assess whether these conditions are likely to be met under the influence of changing technological and geo-political conditions in the 21 st century.
Long-Range Missiles
Today, many analysts assume that the superpowers relatively quickly acquired a reliable, second-strike capability with their submarines: that is, long-range ballistic missiles capable of being fired stealthily from virtually any ocean. This has become the first tenet of the Cold War strategic stability legacy at sea. In fact, however, the two superpowers experienced considerable difficulties during the Cold War in developing safe, effective, and stealthy strategic submarine delivery systems. This created possible instabilities during the nearly two-decade-long period before long-range missiles were perfected. The process of transition has not even started in countries trying to station WMD at sea today, suggesting a possibly prolonged period of greater-than-normal risks. The Soviet Union experienced even greater delays in developing adequate standoff range and had serious difficulties developing solid-fuel missiles for sea-based delivery, raising additional risks.
7
The result was that many SSBNs had to cruise relatively close to enemy shores and, in the case of Soviet submarines, U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) defenses (buoys, ships, submarines, and aircraft) in order to be in a position to fire, thus raising incentives for early use in a crisis and creating instability. Only in the mid-1970s, when the Soviet Navy completed testing of the liquidfuel SS-N-8 (or R-29), with a range of 4,850 miles, did it gain a true stand-off capability.
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Stealth, Invulnerability, and Anti-Submarine Warfare A second key tenet of the undersea strategic stability argument was a belief in the invulnerability of submarines that were designated as "strategic." For the two superpowers, this meant having dozens of stealthy, nuclear-powered submarines on constant deployment, making effective ASW against all of them virtually impossible.
But even during the Cold War, various caveats must be made to sustain this argument.
First, it took a number of years for either country's nuclear submarines to develop the hydroacoustic profile that allowed true stealth to be enjoyed. The Soviet Union, in particular, suffered from a series of early problems in attempting to "quiet" its boats, leading to vulnerabilities to U.S. attack. Indeed, even later in the Cold War, the effectiveness of U.S. ASW through various means of detection created conditions under which Soviet SSBN commanders could not be confident in their ability to avoid destruction by the U.S. Navy. The Soviet development of the "bastioning" strategy-i.e., an explicit rejection of blue-water SSBN operations during a crisis and a plan to fire from port instead-signified the failure of the Soviet Navy to accomplish its goal of SSBN invulnerability.
Given these ASW risks, part of the prerequisite for invulnerability also rested on the large number of SSBNs fielded by both sides. At the height of the Cold War, the United States operated 36 SSBNs out of a half-dozen locations, making the job of tracking them extremely difficult given the limits of available technology. The Soviet Union's SSNs posed somewhat of a threat to U.S. forces, but overall they did not prove up to the task, contributing to relatively lesser vulnerability of the U.S. strategic submarine fleet during the Cold War.
In the emerging undersea environment, a larger number of countries will have minimal sea-based deterrents with as few as one boat at sea at any time, and often mixed with rocket propellant, starting a fire that vented deadly fumes. The damaged and still-burning vessel was scuttled with its nuclear weapons and reactors aboard. Japan and Germany shut down these programs. 16 Today, the NPT continues to allow states to produce nuclear submarines domestically and to purchase them internationally, as long as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards accompany the HEU fuel during the transfer. 17 Once the fuel is on site and moved to the military propulsion program, however, IAEA safeguards are removed. This poses new risks, as a variety of countries are now seeking a full fuel cycle, in some cases through the development of a nuclear propulsion program.
THE CHANGING UNDERSEA ENVIRONMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY
The end of the Cold War had some obvious and initially positive effects on U.S. Interestingly, given pledges by many governments against the proliferation of WMD delivery systems, state perspectives on undersea technology proliferation can at best be described as "subjective." France has made direct sales of advanced submarines to nuclear-armed countries, even transferring whole production lines and designs, apparently discounting any possible threats these exports might cause. Russia continues to be an active exporter of finished diesel submarines and is now providing nuclear reactor and submarine-design technology to China and India. In the Middle East and elsewhere, Germany remains a major submarine exporter, despite the WMD possession of at least one of its clients. Thus, current major power policies (including those of the United States) seem to accept the Cold War premise that-in the right hands-new submarines are safe, or at least not an unduly negative influence on regional security.
But emerging developments suggest that future submarine rivalries could bring out some of the worst characteristics of the U.S.-Soviet period, as well as some new and even more dangerous ones. To better understand actual trends, this scoping study next takes a closer look at international submarine proliferation by dividing it into its two main categories: diesel/AIP submarines and nuclear boats. It then turns to the vexing problem of the emerging ASW threat posed by unmanned surface and sub-surface vessels. As noted above, a perhaps more troubling aspect of a number of recent submarine deals is the willingness (even eagerness) of producers to provide cruise missile systems and advanced torpedoes as part of these transfers. Of greatest concern in regards to the WMD delivery threat are cruise missiles that can be fired from torpedo tubes. Such technologies have only been available on the international market for the past decade or so, although they were developed by the superpowers during the 1970s. While useful for deterrence, these weapons, of course, can also be used offensively. Torpedoes represent a threat to U.S. surface vessels and submarines alike. Unfortunately, a number of countries can provide these systems, mostly notably Russia and France.
Russia, for example, has provided 300-km range Klub S cruise missiles to India for its nine Kilo-class 877 EKM submarines, 36 which can be used to attack land-or seabased targets and could be fitted with nuclear weapons. India has tested the 750-kilometer K-15 (formerly Sagarika) nuclear-capable ballistic missile as well, which is likely eventually to serve as the delivery system for its naval deterrent. 37 In response, Pakistan has claimed that it has also has plans for a sea-based nuclear deterrent, likely based on the In terms of stealth, these diesel and AIP boats will still need to rise to at least periscope depth for communication during crises and will have to snorkel in order to recharge their batteries. These requirements could lead to instability given the restricted areas near opponents' shores where they will have to operate in order to keep their shortrange missiles at a lethal distance. While current ASW capabilities are still relatively underdeveloped in most of these regions, they will undoubtedly improve rapidly as states seek to counter opponents who are deploying WMD against their shores. These pressures may provide incentives for states to launch their missiles under pre-assigned orders or in "use them or lose them" scenarios, rather than encouraging states to hold submarines in reserve, as would be possible with longer-range missiles and submarines.
Despite these risks, current international export control regulations on submarine rules requiring declarations of sales of all submarines capable of carrying missiles/torpedoes. 41 However, even if these guidelines are adopted, they will not constitute real limitations, only new reporting requirements.
Nuclear Submarine Proliferation
Although relatively few countries currently appear to be interested in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, trends toward their continued steady proliferation and the first outright sales of nuclear-powered boats are also noticeable. While there are some compelling rationales for states to seek comparatively cheaper and safer diesel submarines, specific regional pressures, matters of national prestige, and arms race dynamics continue to drive a handful of states to seek nuclear submarines, whether through domestic production or imports. This raises the likelihood that additional states might acquire full-fuel-cycle nuclear capabilities, giving them the option of diverting HEU fuel to a bomb project.
Ironically, part of the reason for this new race to the sea among emerging and would-be nuclear powers may be the international demonstration effect. The most advanced navies in the world (U.S., French, and British) now operate only nuclearpowered submarines, sending a potent signal to other states that nuclear power is better.
Moreover, the world's nuclear powers have steadily placed a higher and higher percentage of their nuclear weapons onto submarines. These goals were specifically embodied in the text of the U.S.-Russian START I agreement and is the clear direction of U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russian nuclear forces in complying with the New START agreement. France has the vast majority of its nuclear weapons on submarines, and the United Kingdom has devoted all of its remaining nuclear weapons to its undersea forces. 42 Meanwhile, China is gradually expanding its nuclear navy and becoming more active in using it. Beijing has begun sending its nuclear-powered Han-class SSNs into 40 David Wood, "Threats emerge from below: thought to be a thing of the past, enemy submarines could be an obstacle to U.S. military might," Navy Times, September 27, 2004. Japanese territorial waters, stirring regional tensions. 43 China has now commissioned the first two of its Jin-class (Type-094) SSBNs and has begun testing its J-2 SLBM with an estimated range of 8,000 km. 44 China is expected to put its next-generation SSN (Type 095) into the water by 2015. 45 Thus, the message is clear: great powers have nuclear submarines and deploy nuclear weapons at sea.
This lesson has not been lost on a number of new nuclear powers, including
Israel, Pakistan, and India. An Israeli commentator made the case a decade ago in an effort to push his country to put nuclear weapons on its German-provided diesel submarines: "The experience of the Cold War has taught that the only way to deal with a nuclear threat is by building a reliable and efficient deterrence capability," specifically through the acquisition of "a submarine force armed with missiles." 46 In a similar vein, Indian Admiral (ret.) L. Ramdas wrote in 1999, stimulating his country's current move toward sea-based weapons, "The least vulnerable platform-both for detection and for destruction-is the missile-carrying submarine." 47 Indeed, he cautioned India not to develop other forms of delivery, citing costs and broader security problems raised by airand ground-based systems. Among this group of growing sea powers, Pakistan made an initial attempt at trying to slow this trend by urging India to agree to a ban on submarinelaunched ballistic missiles. 48 However, there was no interest on India's part in taking up this offer, as New Delhi believed that it had a naval advantage and a critical partner (Russia) willing and able to help it accomplish its goals.
But faulty assumptions among many would-be submarine powers about the relative ease of replicating Cold War conditions at sea taint the notion that simply putting weapons into submarines will be stabilizing. National intentions and doctrines matter, as do the nature of technologies they plan to deploy at sea and the dynamics of the physical and geo-political environments in which they will operate. As Iskander Rehman notes, "South Asia's maritime environment is alarmingly unstructured," due in part to Pakistan's doctrine of "naval brinkmanship." The concept involves a diesel-powered surface vessel with an active sonar tracking device that could be cued to a submarine and operate autonomously to "achieve robust continuous track of the quietest submarine targets over their entire operating envelope."
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The ACTUV will use an active sonar device and surface communications technology and is expected to be "capable of missions spanning thousands of kilometers of range and months of endurance under a sparse remote supervisory control model." 58 It could also be weaponized to destroy a target in a much shorter time, if commanded to do so.
Another concept us that of the large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicle proposed by some experts in the U.S. Navy. This technology could be deployed into critical areas of enemy sea traffic and wait until signaled, then fire weapons that would destroy ships with released mines or short-range torpedoes. As advocates argue, such As Owen Cote argues:
The most challenging scenario for the Navy is one where U.S. access to overseas bases is greatly reduced, and where the proliferation of relatively low cost and easy to use access denial weapons-such as modern dieselelectric submarines, modern anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, and naval mines-continues to grow.
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These undersea platforms will become particularly threatening from an ASW context when such vessels add more capable and more accurate torpedoes to their arsenals. Commodore (Indian Navy, ret.) C.P. Srivastava observes that developments in wire-guided, heavyweight torpedoes "have not only been path breaking but also have significant latent potential, which is yet to be exploited." 61 He predicts that they could achieve "combat ranges of 100 km and endurance in the region of two hours. Since the United States has no current plans to export submarines, there is a powerful logic for Washington to lead these control efforts, particularly as it seeks to implement parallel prohibitions on the spread of WMD and delivery systems around the world. New supplier arrangements could nip a number of emerging undersea risks in the bud, while also protecting U.S. naval interests. A supplier regime for AIP technology might also be proposed, given the similarly small number of current producers. At the very least, sales might be limited to states without WMD capability-to prevent these submarines from serving as WMD delivery systems.
In conclusion, there is bad news and good news that must be grappled with in considering the emerging undersea warfare environment. The development and spread of technology presents options for new capabilities, but its proliferation to multiple states could create a situation that may eventually be harder to deal with than the single, large threat posed by the Soviet Union. Core themes of small size and larger numbers of systems (some of them unmanned) should be applied to future U.S. procurement to address these concerns. Greater efforts should be made to provide a mix of capabilities, leveraging autonomous, U.S. manned systems, and the capabilities of allies. Finally, U.S.
diplomacy needs to become more active in the maritime domain in order to limit or prevent transfers (particularly by allies) that might eventually create undersea instability and heightened risks for U.S. forces.
The good news is that the United States remains the leader in most of these technologies. In addition, the acquisition of critical numbers of undersea manned and unmanned platforms by a number of potential adversaries remains a work in progress, granting time for U.S. forces and policies to react. But the current hubris of much U.S.
planning suggests a failure to consider what could go wrong and, in some cases, very wrong in the future undersea world. At a time of U.S. leadership, assuming the best conditions and continued dominance via large undersea platforms is unwise. Instead, planning for the new challenges of the future should be done with a careful eye to the implications of a changing environment on U.S. operations and adjusting accordingly.
